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BOOK REVIEWS 
Land, Food and Work in East Java. By Wade C. Edmundson. New England 
Monographs in Geography, No. 4. Department of Geography, University 
of New England, Armidale, N.S.W., Australia, 1976, vi + 115 pp., photo- 
graphs, tables, appendices, bibliography, A$6.00 (paper). 
It is quite unlikely that many have heard of the New England Monographs 
in Geography, at least outside of Australia. The present contribution is only the 
fourth, and the paper-bound, mimeograph format indicates a low-budget limited 
circulation enterprise. Yet, i f  Land, Food and Work in East Java is any indication 
of what has gone before and what is to come, subscriptions should be on the in- 
crease in the near future. 
Edmundson's basic concern is with documenting the relationships among 
wealth, nutrition, and work in order to test the widely held belief in develop- 
ment circles "that low levels of caloric intake result in low levels of human per- 
formance" (p. 1). This is a quite straightforward problem as stated, but it 
brought the author face to face with two of the most difficult areas of human 
behavior to measure: diet and activity patterns. Both have escaped accurate and 
easy quantification, and there are no widely agreed upon field methods. Given 
this situation, Edmundson decided to concentrate on a relatively small sample, 
18 adult males from each of three villages, and to obtain as much data from their 
food intake and activities as possible. Diet was determined by weighing home 
consumed meals for six consecutive days at 2 month intervals during the year 
and estimating the weights of foods eaten away from home during these same 
periods. Fortunately, help was available from Javanese health officials, who 
provided teams of two researchers each, one for weighing each meal's ingredients 
and the other for observing the subject outside the home. Activities were mea- 
sured by portable respirometer to determine oxygen calorimetry. Standardized 
values were obtained for lying, squatting, sitting, standing, walking, carrying, 
hoeing, and a variety of other activities categorized as light, medium, or heavy 
work. Each subject was then followed during his waking hours in order to 
classify his daily rounds. All the various procedures and problems of these 
recording methods are clearly discussed in Chapter 2, which also includes a 
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valuable discussion of how to draw a sample population when textbook circum- 
stances do not prevail. 
Chapter 3 follows with an overview of the three study villages. One is 
located in an alluvial valley with wet rice the subsistence base, the second is 
supported primarily by maize cultivation on upland volcanic soils, and the 
third is situated on a limestone plateau and relies on a combination of maize 
and cassava. Edmundson mixes a general narrative designed to give a "feel" 
for each place with specific facts and figures on environment, economy, and 
society with effective results. Missing, however, are maps that would have 
helped in establishing even more effective images. I suspect that costs were a 
primary factor in their omission. 
The fourth and final chapter deals with the data. Using Pearsonian Coef- 
ficients of Correlation, Edmundson finds size of land holdings a good index of 
wealth, but he then observes no correlation of this with caloric intake. In other 
words, wealth seems to be unrelated to diet. This is an unexpected finding, and 
Edmundson sets forth six possible relationships to explain it. First, cultural 
preferences outweigh economic status when it comes to food because rich and 
poor have similar tastes. Second, there are enough calories available to meet 
basic needs, at least for the adult males who are given special preference. Third, 
the poorer work harder and therefore consume more food than the wealthier 
members of  the community. Fourth, the wealthier families tend to have more 
dependents to feed. Fifth, a variety of alternative activities are available for 
those who are land-poor so that they can earn enough for minimal subsistence. 
And sixth, social obligation and reciprocity act to redistribute food throughout 
the village. 
Edmundson continues to explode the conventional wisdom by finding no 
relationship between caloric intake and work output. All 54 subjects expended 
about 2400 calories per day, but varying consumption led to a range in balances 
from a deficit of 918 calories to a surplus of 1552 calories. The former person 
should have wasted away over the year and the latter become obese, but no 
significant weight changes were observed. The only explanation offered is the 
likelihood of individual differences in energy efficiency, with some needing 
more and others less to support the same level of activity. 
Several other worthwhile findings emerged in addition to the two primary 
ones. One is the seemingly adequate nutritional status of  the villagers. Edmund- 
son found few signs of malnutrition, the main exception being among the elder- 
ly. He notes that past age 45 both males and females are no longer fit for heavy 
field work, and they age rapidly. The reasons for this deterioration are not 
discussed, but two possible explanations come to mind. It could be that the 
nutritional state of  adults is not as adequate as it seems and, when the stresses 
of old age begin, the body is less able to cope with them. More likely is that 
there is a cultural adjustment to a limited food supply. Edmundson does point 
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out that individuals reaching their mid-40s begin eating less and less, thus pos- 
sibly helping to ensure an adequate food supply for those in their most produc- 
tive years. 
Edmundson also notes the considerable work activity of the adult males, 
belying the stereotype of the "lazy" Javanese peasant. About 26% of the time 
involved productive work, amounting to over 40 hours per week. People are 
not underemployed, rather "they are simply unproductive in the sense of having 
too much inefficient work done by too malay people" (p. 82). Surprisingly, the 
sample laborers from the wet rice village worked a little less than those from the 
other two. 
In his discussion of energy expenditure, Edmundson lapses into a rare 
moment of carelessness. He claims that Javanese peasants are likely to be more 
fit than Westerners, or at least energetically more efficient. But his comparison 
group was 10 college students from the United States and Australia who hap- 
pened to visit the area, hardly an appropriate one against which to measure 
physically active peasant males. 
All in all, this is a valuable and rewarding book. The problem is an im- 
portant one from the standpoint of nutrition policy and development, and 
Edmundson does his best to bring hard data to its resolution. Also, as in most 
good studies, more questions are raised than answered. 
James L. Newman 
Department of Geography 
Syracuse University 
Syracuse, New York 
Human Ecology in the Tropics (2nd edition). Edited by J. P. Garlick and R. W. J. 
Keay. Symposia of the Society for the Study of Human Biology, Volume 
16. Halsted Press, New York, 1977, vii + 200 pp., figures, chapter ref- 
erences, indexes, $12.00 (cloth). 
In recent years it appears to have become obligatory to publish the pro- 
ceedings of symposia. The present volume goes one step further; it presents a 
second edition of proceedings originally published in 1969. The first edition 
arose from a 1966 symposium on human ecology in the tropics organized joint- 
ly by the British Ecological Society and the Society for the Study of Human 
Biology. Changes in the second edition comprise the addition of three new 
papers to the eight originally published. Unfortunately there is no evidence in 
these additions of the results of research in population biology and plant/animal 
interactions that has so transformed tropical ecology in the last decade. 
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The subject matter treated in the papers is a mixed bag. Two may be 
called anthropological, four treat agricultural and forestry topics, and the re- 
mainder are medical. Throughout, the emphasis is heavily upon the African 
tropics. The formats of the papers also vary. Some are case studies, others are 
review papers, and a few are no more than brief comments. Matters are wor- 
sened by the lack of adherence of the topics of most papers to the symposium's 
title. (Wright's paper on the ecology of African schistosomiasis is a notable excep- 
tion.) While such a varied mix can be stimulating in the proceedings of a large 
symposium, in such a slim volume as this one the treatment provided can only 
be described as uneven. I would have hoped for greater care in the selection of a 
balanced blend of topics in order to bridge a gap that seems to exist in writings 
on tropical human ecology. Most of this literature seems to fit naturally into 
one of two classes. The first are those generalizations about the tropics as a 
habitat for man that are so often treated as to be clicMs. The second are detached 
case studies. What is so often missing, and what I had hoped ~o fred here, are 
papers spanning the gap by evaluating old generalizations in the light of recent 
case studies. Unfortunately, the dichotomy has been preserved. 
The lack of firm organization is reflected in other ways. Editorial control 
appears to have been nonexistent. Some papers are grossly padded: that by Moss 
and Morgan on the savanna/forest transition in Nigeria contains no less than 
seven pages of plant species lists that will be virtually unintelligible to anyone 
save a tropical taxonomist. Other papers are repetitive and lack clarity: I found 
the one by Turton on the response to drought by the Mursi of Ethiopia especial- 
ly tedious. Not even the bibliographies are in a standard format. I find such lax 
editing to be annoying in first editions and inexcusable in second editions. 
Despite these criticisms, the volume does contain some good papers, most- 
ly on medical topics. Ingram provides a useful summary of the physiological reac- 
tions to heat in man, a topic that he has treated in great depth in a recent volume 
published jointly with Mount. Thompson provides a summary of findings by a 
medical/sociological team on morbidity and mortality among children in a 
Gambian village. This represents an excellent piece of inductive tropical field 
work. Wright's paper on schistosomiasis neatly spans the medical and sociological 
dimensions of the problem. Ford's paper on the epidemiology of trypanosomiasis 
provides no clear conclusions but illustrates the complexities that so often be- 
devil tropical research. 
Despite these highlights, I remain unconvinced that proceedings of this 
symposium justified publication, let alone a second edition. While the few good 
papers represent sound scholarship, the majority of papers would not, in my 
opinion, have passed a critical journal reviewer. Synthetic treatments of  the 
ecology of  man in the tropics are certainly needed, but, with the few exceptions 
cited, these have not been provided in this volume. This is not to say that the 
contributions may not have been of value within the context of the original 
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symposium. However, not all symposia produce publishable material, and i 
wish that more editors would bear this in mind. 
Martin Keltman 
Department of Geography 
York University 
Do wnsview, Ontario 
Canada 
Where Hunters Gathered: a Study of Holocene Stone Age People in the Eastern 
Cape. By H. J. Deacon. South African Archaeological Society, Cape Town, 
Monograph Series No. 1, 1976, xiii + 232 pp., illustrations, bibliography, 
appended tables, R7.50 (paper). 
The prehistory of southern Africa was long viewed as an uneventful chap- 
ter in the saga of a turbulent continent, where most biological evolution and 
cultural innovation were first centered in the Rift and then in the Nile Valley. 
In part, this impression was due to the seemingly homogeneous post-Pleistocene 
lithic industries, and the quaintly conservative culture of the Khoisan speakers 
reported by travelers of the 17th to 19th centuries. In part, too, it was a reflec- 
tion of ignorance and imperfect understanding. 
Where Hunters Gathered brings together much of H. J. Deacon's research 
on the Later Stone Age (LSA) in a sector of the eastern Cape Province. Although 
organized as a report on two sites, Melkhoutboom and Highlands, the volume 
strives to generate models of prehistoric adaptations during the Pleistocene- 
Holocene transition ca. 14,500-7500 BP as well as the environmentally less 
eventful millenia that followed. Deacon's data base is provided by meticulous 
excavations and detailed study and evaluation of the rich paleobotanical record 
at his sites, complemented by Klein's (1977) essential study of an unprecedented 
number of faunal assemblages from almost every prehistoric sequence in the Cape 
Province. 
Melkhoutboom is an open quartzite cavern in the irregular terrain of the 
Cape Folded Ranges, 650 m above sea level and 60 km from the Indian Ocean. 
The setting is a vegetation mosaic, with evergreen forest in the adjacent ravine, 
bush savanna downstream, sclerophyllous vegetation on the higher mountain 
slopes, and grass savanna on the upland ridges. Some 14 m 2 of the potential 
cave living area of 150 m 2 were excavated to a maximum depth of 1.95 m (bed- 
rock). Occupation began ca. 15,500 BP and may have terminated as late as 250 
BP, based on eight Carbon 14 dates. Except for a 30 cm layer of crude rock 
rubble, probably dating 14,500-10,500 BP, the strata are preeminently cultural 
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in origin, with little or no mineral accumulation apparent at times of cave 
abandonment. 
The first millenium of habitation at Melkhoutboom is represented by 
the Robberg industry, made primarily on quartzite (44%) and silcrete (17%), 
including a strong micro-bladelet component, produced from high-backed 
cores and presumably intended for hafting of stone bits into composite tools. 
Medium to large grazers, namely red hartbeest and a zebrine (quagga?), are 
the key faunal elements, while marine shell is absent. Plant preservation here 
and in the overlying culturallevel is limited to carbonized seeds that were not 
studied systematically, but that are consistent with those of the Holocene 
levels, with the possibly significant exception that seeds ofPodocarpus, a modern 
forest dominant, are absent. Occupation 10,500-7500 BP pertains to the Albany 
industry, which favored quartzite (70%, with less than 5% silcrete and chal- 
cedony) and here consists chiefly of flakes. Medium-sized alcelaphine antelopes 
and quagga were the chief game, and marine shell is present throughout. 
From 7500 BP to the 18th century the cave occupants produced varieties 
of the Wilton industry, characterized by microlithic convex scrapers and segments 
(crescents), backed bladelets, adzes and borers, some with examples of attached 
mastic, and all attributed to composite tools. Raw materials initially included 
20-40% chalcedony and 9% silcrete but, following an occupation break ca. 
5500-3000 BP, quartzite frequencies increased abruptly at the same time that 
marine shell decreased, freshwater mussel increased, and storage pits became a 
feature in the cave. The Wilton levels not only include rare manos, abundant 
wooden tools, bone implements, and ostrich eggshell ornaments, but also fiber 
cordage, netting, and matting, as well as leather fragments. The plant residues 
show that the rootstocks, corms, and bulbs of monocot geophytes (growing in 
the sclerophyllous and grassy areas above the cave) were staple foods; these 
would have been most visible or palatable in spring and early summer. Although 
the popular Watsonia corms are low in protein, seeds are present and there was 
subsidiary hunting of nocturnal, solitary, small browsing antelopes (by snares?) 
as Well as collecting of tortoise and freshwater crab. Deacon further postulates 
a seasonal pattern of "transhumance," with winter coastal settlements focused 
on fish and mollusks. 
The rich Wilton record suggests stable technological and subsistence sub- 
systems over 7 millenia, with changes in size and form of specific tool classes 
interpreted in stylistic rather than functional terms. Deacon prefers a homeostatic 
model for the unspecialized Wilton adaptation: Shifting modes in scraper produc- 
tion are considered as minor adjustments that maintain the system in relative 
constancy. The earlier Robberg and Albany adaptations are also considered 
stable, but they were of a different kind: These late Pleistocene to early Holocene 
populations were more mobile, more dispersed, and less "territorial," whereas 
the Wilton people knew the precise location of a broad selection of resources in 
a mosaic environment, controlled a successful exploitation strategy, and were 
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thus permitted a greater population density, a closer nesting of population cells, 
a more sedentary existence, and more fixed territories. 
The excavation at Highlands complements the spatial perspective. This is 
an 18 m 2 rock overhang and ledge on the side of a residual hill ca. 1300 m 
elevation, at the periphery of the semiarid South African interior and 210 km 
from the coast. A disconformity of at least 25 millenia separates weathered, 
older strata (with unreported Middle Stone Age) from a LSA deposit recording 
most of the last 4500 years. An area of 6.7 m 2 was excavated to a depth of 90 
cm, of which up to 65 cm pertain to the LSA ("Smithfield"). The artifacts, 
generally made on metamorphosed shale, are dominated by unmodified flakes, 
with formal, shaped tools well represented by hafted tool bits, scrapers, adzes, 
backed pieces, and borers; bone and wood points, shell ornaments and rare 
manos are also present, together with a single piece of leather and some trade 
beads in the topmost level. Ostrich eggshell is at least 10 times as frequent, 
relative to unmodified flakes, as at Melkhoutboom, suggesting an important 
food resource. The most common faunal remains include two small antelopes - 
the springbok, a plains grazer, and the steenbok, a b rowser -  as well as rock 
hyrax, hares, and tortoise. Plant remains include a rootstock and, above all, 
bulbs of Cyperus usitatus that imply summer occupance. Larger game and 
freshwater mussles are rare, but may have been exploited in lowland micro- 
habitats. Highlands is attributed to short-term summer occupation by small 
groups representing a single socioeconomic system through time. Although 
the lithics suggest derivation from a different cultural tradition than Melkhout- 
boom, and even though different species were utilized (or the same species 
utilized in different frequencies), the basic subsistence pattern appears to have 
been much the same at both sites. 
Deacon views his Highlands excavation as a pilot that helps define tech- 
nological and subsistence contrasts and similarities between the Wilton, of the 
mesic coastal and montane environments, and the "Smithfield," of a marginal 
interior setting that was largely unpopulated for several millenia prior to 4500 
BP. The Wilton crescents and the "Smithfield" backed points and segmented 
back bladelets represent a significant differences in formal, hafted tool design 
and preferences that Deacon considers to be stylistic. The Wilton and "Smith- 
field" corresponded to major ecological divisions and may reflect different 
linguistic groupings. In concluding, Deacon presents and discusses a model for 
relating the hierarchical levels of archeological data (industry, phase, occurrence) 
to social units (linguistic, dialectic, residential, subsistence) within the geogra- 
phical context of the Eastern Cape. 
Whatever its shortcomings, Where Hunters Gathered is an invaluable study. 
Some less than exemplary aspects must, however, be mentioned. For example, 
in evaluating the faunal evidence Deacon ignores Klein's sound case for several 
megafaunal extinctions (Equus capensis, a large zebra;Pelorovis, a giant buffalo; 
Megalotragus, a giant alcelaphine) in the Cape Province during the Pleistocene- 
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Holocene transition. Although these animals are not recorded at Melkhoutboom, 
Klein has made a reasonable case that selective hunting pressures within changing 
habitat mosaics may have had significant impact on the demography of several 
key game species. Furthermore, the botanical analyses lack information on pos- 
sible pollen and opal phytoliths while systematic flotation studies were not 
undertaken. This may conceivably result in a one-sided assessment of the relative 
composition of gathered plant resources. The other botanical data, unparalleled 
in archeological excavations almost anywhere, nevertheless do not allow estimates 
of the ratio of vegetable to animal food components. Altogether this implies that 
Deacon's subsistence conclusions are, statistically viewed, qualitative, or, at best, 
semiquantitative. 
No sedimentological study accompanied Deacon's excavations, and even 
the basic geological descriptions are inadequate and inconsistent (including a 
basal, roof spall horizon in Melkhoutboom, Fig. 9, not mentioned in the text 
but negated by the description on p. 24). The fact that deposits are mainly of 
cultural origin has not precluded significant lithostratigraphic deductions in 
numerous other cave sequences, including South African sites. Deacon attempts 
to consider the role of environmental change, but he does so reluctantly, admit- 
ting a change from primarily open to more forested environments, accompanied 
by marine transgression across the coastal shelf, during the Pleistocene-Holocene 
transition. He assumes that mosaic environments exploited by unspecialized, 
broad-spectrum subsistence techniques are unsusceptible to minor ecological 
shifts. This is fallacious, since geophyte productivity is partly related to climate, 
and animal communities are influenced by the expansion or contraction of bush 
in mosaic settings. Such short- or long-term changes should eventually affect 
the ratio of site ("local community") size to effective catchment, with dem- 
ographic or territorial implications. 
The Carbon 14 framework at Melkhoutboom suggests rapid sedimentation 
rates of 30-60 cm/1000 yr during intervals of repeated, periodic occupation, and 
a few more Carbon 14 dates would certainly serve to demonstrate long periods of 
cave abandonment (as much as 500 years prior to 6000 BP and 1500 years prior 
to 3000 BP) - a matter never considered by Deacon. It may well be relevant 
that a paleosol and a period of temporary forest advance in the southeastern 
Cape have dates of 7030 and 6870 BP, subsequent to which coastal vegetation 
was more open and slopes were unstable; truly mesic conditions can be dated 
ca. 4200-1000 BP, with recurrent geomorphic instability thereafter (Butzer 
and Helgren, 1972). The "minor adjustments" between "Formative," "Devel- 
oped," and "Post-Climax" Wilton coincide with the major sedimentary breaks 
at Melkhoutboom; they also happen to match the landscape shifts after 6870 
and before 4200 BP, while slope disequilibrium since 1000 BP coincides with 
the appearance of herding and pottery in the area. One may therefore wonder 
whether Deacon has not overemphasized stability and downplayed the pos- 
sibility of ecological readjustments during the Holocene. 
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These reservations do not deprecate the quality of  a unique study, since 
it is in the nature of archeological research that optimal results are never quite 
achieved. The very fact that Deacon can arrive at so many well argued con- 
clusions demonstrates the quality and detail of his data. Where Hunters Gathered 
is the most thoughtful and thought-provoking analysis of its kind to deal with 
sub-Saharan Africa in almost a decade. 
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The Legacy of Malthus: The Social Costs of  the New Scientific Racism. By 
Allan Chase. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1977, xxvii + 686 pp., figures, 
chapter notes, glossary, references, index, $17.95 (cloth). 
It is always pleasant to review the misconceptions of the past from the 
standpoint of  our own "modern and enlightened" age; it is less pleasant to 
discover that the misconceptions persist in virulent form. It 's rather like casual- 
ly reading about plague in the Middle Ages, then discovering that plague is on 
the increase in one's home town. Comfortable illusions of superiority are shat- 
tered, and this is Allan Chase's intention in tracing the genealogies of the found- 
ing fathers of  eugenics-  Malthus and G a l t o n -  through to their present-day 
adherents, such as Jensen and Eysenck. 
In The Legacy of  Malthus Chase discusses the illusions that Americans 
maintain about improvements in human well-being over the last two centuries. 
Medical advances have benefited the middle and upper classes, but these ad- 
vances have not always been available to the poor. This lack, the author says, is 
largely due to the contrivances of  those who embrace Malthusian doctrines about 
poverty. Chase begins with the notions propounded by Malthus - that popula- 
tion increases must inevitably overtake food production, that the poor must 
remain poor to serve as a stimulus to production - and continues to the eugenic 
laws propounded by Galton - that the poor should be prevented from breeding 
if the species is not to be degraded. Chase then brings his analysis of  this curious 
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dogma down to current legislation and court decisions dealing with forced 
sterilization, IQ test scores, and EEG readings. 
Blaming the poor for poverty is not a new pastime, nor is the logic that 
underlies the pseudoscientific claims in any way abstruse. Indeed, the simplicity 
of the argument must be part of its long-standing appeal. If A equals B and B 
equals C, then A must equal C, or, in 19th century terms, if the Irish are poor 
and poverty is correlated with "inherited diseases," then being Irish must mean 
having inferior genes. In 20th century America, if low IQ scores are correlated 
with poverty and poverty is correlated with skin color, then low IQ scores must 
be correlated with skin color. Or, if pellagra is associated with poverty, and 
poverty is associated with a particular ethnic group, then pellagra and ethnic 
groups must be associated in some fixed way, not subject to the efforts of true 
science or to the betterment of the diet or living conditions. 
A fine example is given in Chase's ninth chapter, in which he documents 
the discovery of the cause of pellagra. Pellagra was long held to be an hereditary 
affliction, until its cause was discovered in 1914, when the disease was produced 
by feeding prisoners a high carbohydrate diet with no protein or green vegetables. 
Despite this and other proofs, pellagra continued to be thought of as hereditary 
(mainly occurring among poor White Southerners) and was not eradicated until 
federal work and food relief programs were introduced in 1933. 
If the logic of the eugenicists' argument is poor, its premises are worse. 
A major premise, one that recurs in article titles, is that the dreaded effects of 
democracy must be mitigated, that the "dark-skinned untrammeled copulators" 
(p. 514) must be stopped before the "good genes" of the rich are overwhelmed. 
Minor premises are that genes are unit characters (one gene = one trait), and that 
some genes preclude certain kinds of development. Armed with such hazy dogma 
and a determination to demonstrate the superiority of the "Nordics," the eugeni- 
cists could deal with discoveries that seemingly refuted their ideas. When it was 
found that Blacks had faster reflexes than Whites, the genes for reflexes were 
said to prevent normal brain development (p. 230), and, under the same premises, 
Jews were considered to be too "intelligent" to find places in American society 
(p. 277). Genes do not work this way, and it is'unfortunate for the poor that 
legislators can be misled into believing that they do, with such results as the 
U.S. Immigration Act of 1924 (p. 289). 
This kind of misguided attempt to show the "genetic" basis of poverty 
is the true legacy of Malthus. Galton and Malthus were not racists, except in 
the broadest sense of the term. They believed that there were two kinds of 
people in the world, those whom Spencer called the "deserving rich and the 
undeserving poor," and that the rich were of superioi genetic make-up. The 
poor inherited all sorts of afflictions, just as the rich inherited careers in banking. 
The addition of skin color to these premises came later, but even while most of 
the data used as proof were discredited (head form by Boas, p. 181; IQ scores 
by Binet and Simon, p. 36), the philosophy has shown a remarkable staying 
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power. Science may proceed slowly, but pseudoscientific findings, unhampered 
by facts, can proceed apace, arriving at 20th-century conclusions that the 18th 
century would have applauded. Malthus's conclusions about the futility of the 
poor laws are rewritten in modern terms that deal with the "ineducability" 
of the poor (p. 273). 
Chase refers to the dogma of  scientific racism as the "great counter-human- 
ist tradition," and the phrase is well taken. What is most frightening about the 
scientific racists is their conviction that equality of opportunity must be legis- 
lated against: "the error of human equality" is a recurring phrase (p. 179). The 
success of the scientific racists in undermining legislative attempts to help the poor 
or the unfortunate has included immigration restrictions and cutbacks of food 
supplement programs. The efforts of the scientific racists may be clumsy or ludi- 
crous - as when they attempt to prove that various sages must have been White 
men, that Jesus Christ was not a Jew (p. 172), that Confucius was not Chinese 
(p. 176) - but their intentions are not funny, and neither are the effects of their 
beliefs. 
There were things about this book I did not like. It is too long, it is occa- 
sionally repetitious, and there are moments when refutation gives way to polem- 
ics. But these are unimportant quibbles. Chase, a professional writer, has done 
the scholarly community a good turn. The book will serve as a fine reference 
text for courses on demography, ecology, growth and development studies, and 
many others. I would like to see its message and (only some of) its data repro- 
duced in a series of magazine articles more accessible to the general public, lest 
the message - as happened with the finding that Black school children in an af- 
fluent Los Angeles neighborhood scored higher on IQ tests than any other 
group in the public school system - be lost. 
Eugenia ShankIin 
Department of Sociology-Anthropology 
Trenton State College 
Trenton, New Jersey 
Culture and Practical Reason. By Marshall Sahlins. The University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1976, xi + 252 pp., illustrations, bibliography, $17.50 
(cloth). 
Sahlins' aim here is to "liberate anthropology from the prison house of 
naturalism" (p. 102). His plan is to criticize the various theories that portray the 
forms of human culture as the outcomes of utility-optimizing interactions be- 
tween people and the objective noncultural world. After criticizing these theories 
of practical reason, Sahlins argues that symbolic or meaningful reason structures 
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our behavior. He asserts that the former theories ultimately reduce human affairs 
to biological survival, whereas the latter portrays us as an organism uniquely 
endowed with the capacity to impose meaningful schemes upon natural instru- 
ments. Thus the issue that Sahlins raises is potentially crucial for human ecology. 
Can it develop by the analytical, reductionist methods of the natural sciences 
and by grounding the social sciences in biology and physics? Or will understand- 
ing ultimately come from relegating the natural sciences to a subordinate role 
while attending to the distinctive qualities of minds creating symbolic order? 
The first three chapters of the book examine the work of a series of 
theorists in light of the distinction between practical and meaningful reason. 
Chapter 1 treats British structuralism, French structuralism, and the Marxist re- 
action to both. The unsatisfactory provisional conclusion drawn by Sahlins from 
this chapter is that two theories are apparently required: (1) French structura- 
lism for tribal cultures, and (2) praxis theory (to some extent Marxism and British 
structuralism are both praxis theories) for modern bourgeois ones. 
The second chapter deals with the historical development of theory in the 
social sciences by examining the work of influential anthropologists including 
Morgan, Boas, Malinowski, Murdock, Steward, and Leslie White. In assessing the 
debates among these theorists, Sahlins sees a "repetitive and cyclical opposition" 
between practical and symbolic reasoning, between those who would keep cul- 
ture and mind and those who cast them out in favor of ecological adaptation. 
White is the exception in whose work the two paradigms coexist in unresolved 
opposition. 
The third chapter explores the interplay of culture and practical reason in 
Marxist thought. According to Sahlins, Marx neither fell prey to the error of 
vulgar naturalism nor developed a fully symbolic paradigm. But while seeking an 
explanation for the ultimate source of value, Marx was compelled to naturalize 
the cultural determination of production in order to have a material prime cause 
of historical processes. 
The fourth chapter argues that practical reason is a special bourgeois myth 
developed by and appropriate for our peculiar kind of economizing society. 
Western food and dress customs are cited as examples of the way in which sym- 
bolic reason in fact preempts practical economizing, even in America; for Sahlins, 
eating beef but not horsemeat and dressing up for visits to the city are evidence 
of a cultural system independent of practical reason. Ultimately, he believes that 
we must turn to cultural reason to understand the generation of the values that 
become objectified in bourgeois culture as exchange value. 
Sahlins presents his theory of culture in the concluding chapter: The sym- 
bolic cultural order is primary, no specific cultural form can be derived from 
material circumstances, and cultures differ by the institutions which figure most 
prominently in their systems of cultural categories. Tribal societies have kinship 
as the primary locus of symbolic differentiation, whereas in "hot"  modern so- 
cieties the locus is the relationship of individuals to production. Practical reason, 
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or economizing in the face of nature, is for Sahlins a symbolic cultural logic; we 
see the world as a locus for optimizing individual advantage only because we 
constructed such a world in the first place. Fox us, as well as for other societies, 
the free play of cultural reason invents the ultimate values for which people 
organize their use of natural instruments, subject only to the minimum ecolog- 
ical constraint of physical persistence. 
As an abstract exercise in formulating a plausible link between French 
stmcturalism and Marxism, Culture and Practical Reason is a clever piece of argu- 
ment. But does it effectively exclude the possibility that individual or collective 
economizing behavior is an important determinant of cultural form? Absolutely 
not, and the difficulties with Sahlins' position are manifold. Most important is 
that Sahlins is very vague about what he means by cultural reason, a serious 
shortcoming given the uncompromising position he takes with regard to the im- 
portance of ecological adaptation. He develops no model of the structure-genera- 
ting process, and the essential categories of "mind" and "meaning," fraught as 
they are with unresolved philosophical debates, are virtually undefined and un- 
examined here. Sahlins likewise uses "culture" without a hint of the conceptual 
complexities surrounding this term. Accordingly, we cannot devise tests to de- 
termine whether or not Sahlins' cultural logic is an adequate scientific hypothesis 
because the idea, as it stands, is not sufficiently rich in propositions with empiri- 
cal referents to be useful. Not really knowing what cultural logic is, we cannot 
imagine how it might have arisen from mere animal existence, or just how it in- 
teracts with the material world. 
This objection is not to say that a genuine hypothesis cannot be developed 
from Sahlins' rudimentary concepts, but only that he fails to do so. Indeed, a 
very simple one can be constructed. The key to cultural reason is the relative ar- 
bitrariness of symbolic forms. This feature is common to all code systems, from 
DNA to human languages. Since referents to material reality in such systems are 
conventional, and since the grammars of many complex codes permit a very 
large number of messages, the code can evolve arbitrarily so long as conventional 
meanings are maintained. Synchronically, the same pattern holds. An industrial 
system of production can apparently be equally well organized using a wide 
variety of languages as the media of expression. Indeed, where secret or semi- 
secret messages, such as the etiquette signals that signify membership in a privi- 
leged elite, are to be communicated, the message must evolve faster than out- 
siders can learn it. This kind of hypothesis is admirably formalized by Abner 
Cohen (1974) to apply to just those sorts of nonlinguistic symbolic phenomena 
of complex societies that Sahlins views as requiring cultural logic for explana- 
tion. Cohen's theo D, involves an intimate dialectic between the symbolic and 
practical orders. From this perspective, Sahlins' cultural determinism is just one 
extreme along a continuum of potentially logically consistent hypotheses which 
range to the opposite extreme of complete ecological determinism. Cultural and 
adaptational causality may interact in complex ways. Further, insofar as the 
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same meaning can be communicated by an arbitrarily large number of symbolic 
systems, the rigid opposition between practical and cultural logic disappears and 
the two kinds of phenomena become weakly interacting, and therefore partly 
independent, intellectual problems. 
It is clear that Sahlins' empirical examples of Eastern Fijian dualism (in 
Chapter 1) and American food and dress customs will fit the weak-interaction 
hypothesis. Structural metaphors, like language, have arbitrary conventional 
meanings. In changed circumstances, a groupof  people can change the referent 
of a symbol, while keeping the system of symbols intact, or invent a minor ad- 
dition to cover the new case. To show that cultural reason controls behavior 
with respect to material reality, Sahlins would have to show how structural logic 
strongly constrains such behavior, which he does not do. Further, in order to 
make his theory in the least plausible, Sahlins must postulate an extreme ecol- 
ogical possibilism (p. 209) in order to give cultural logic force over practical 
exigencies. His idea that adaptations are "minimum positive functioning," a 
wholly erroneous interpretation of the underlying Darwinian theory, is required 
to sustain this view. 
The rhetorical force in Sahlins' argument stems from two sources. The 
first is his separation of cultural and practical reason into categorical alternatives. 
This treatment is almost certain to erect paradoxical polarities which seem in- 
soluble. This approach seems counterproductive, as the success of modern mathe- 
matics and natural science stems from their reformulation of philosophical para- 
doxes into linkage and continuum (Rapoport, 1967). The second is the historical 
approach to his critique. This permits Sahlins to let Marx, Malinowski, and Ste- 
ward serve as foils for his argument, rather than his more sophisticated contem- 
poraries like Cohen. In any case, scientific explanations are always more or less 
incomplete, nowhere more so than in the social sciences. Human ecologists have 
every reason to take seriously Sahlins' critique of naive adaptation theories, but 
no reason to accept his alternative explanation. 
Part of the problem is epistemological. Sahlins (1972:xiii; 1977) is skepti- 
cal of conventional scientific modes of explanation and believes that scientific 
theory can be substantially (irredeemably?) contaminated by the imperatives of 
a given cultural order. But if this opinion is correct, how can any attempt to 
understand the human condition be more than merely a relative account? If we 
have a choice between modes of understanding, how do we choose? Although 
these problems are raised explicitly against theories of practical reason by sug- 
gesting that these are bourgeois myths, Sahlins abandons any close adherence to 
the methods of positivistic science without sketching an alternative. Positivistic 
science may eventually be proven a particular Western cultural logic, but it has 
succeeded dramatically in providing internally consistent explanations of pre- 
viously mysterious natural phenomena. Given the existing state of human en- 
lightenment, we cannot be sure that scientific explanations of cultural pheno- 
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mena will be as satisfactory, but I certainly believe the attempt is worthwhile 
pending a much more convincing demonstration of an alternative mode of 
understanding. 
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The Use and Abuse of Biology: An Anthropological Critique of Sociobiology. 
By Marshall Sahlins. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1976, 
xv+120 pp., bibliography, $8.00 (cloth), $3.95 (paper). 
The split between the "two cultures" did not begin, as C. P. Snow would 
have us believe (1963), in the world of his own youth at the beginning of the pre- 
sent century but in the opposition posed by the Romantic movement to the En- 
lightenment over a hundred years earlier. However, as Lord Snow records, the 
two cultures were still speaking to each other at the time of World War I. Now, it 
would seem, we have arrived at the point where, if they converse at all, they are 
talking at rather than with each other, and genuine communication is severely 
reduced at best. 
The different reactions to a single word, "sociobiology," trenchantly il- 
lustrate the state of  the current impasse. This is interpreted to mean everything 
from a manifestation of the second coming to the devil incarnate. In a very real 
sense, this is a continuation of the nature/nurture arguments of nearly a century 
ago, and these themselves were just slightly rephrased versions of  the free-will 
vs. predestination conflicts of  a still earlier time. 
The current renewal of  this old controversy was sparked by the publication 
of E. O. Wilson's book, Sociobiology: The Ne w  Synthesis, in 1975. Many have 
viewed this as a call to arms and have rushed to ally themselves pro or con. The 
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result has been a sharp polarization among the more vocal discussants. These 
have tended ~to resort to "which-side-are-you-on" rhetoric with an emotional 
stridency more characteristic of religious or political dispute than of dispassionate 
science. Indeed, an underlying political motivation has been suggested as the rea- 
son for adherence to its tenets by both supporters and detractors. 
Among the foremost of the latter must be ranked Marshall Sahlins, whose 
little book, The Use and Abuse o f  Biologyl is really an extended review of Wil- 
son's tome. It takes just a couple of Wilson's unguarded statements as the raison 
d~tre of what basically winds up being a cri du coeur. The sprinkling of French 
references in Sahlins' text leads one to suspect that at least some of the outrage 
expressed is the result of his debt to the milieu of French intellectualism. At 
bottom, what the book represents is a continuation of the 19th-century French 
objection to the bases of Darwinian evolution, and Sahlins carries it off with a 
panache that is in the best Gallic tradition. The verbal style' is skillful and engag- 
ing, the display of multifaceted erudition is impressive if occasionally superficial, 
and eloquent logic is used in the characteristically French manner in which the 
object is to obfuscate rather than to edify. 
Wilson's Sociobiology is a ponderous volume, and few who are not some- 
how directly involved are likely to read it from cover to cover, although it is in 
fact quite readable throughout. Many, however, will choose a shorter route such 
as Sahlins' work. Unfortunately they will be in the position of the three blind 
men who tried to describe an elephant, noting variously that it resembled a rope, 
a tree, and a snake. For all the brilliant vignettes and the occasional depiction of 
what are indeed serious flaws in Wilson's "sociobiology," Sahlins never once tells 
the reader what Wilson thinks it is. Since the vast bulk of Wils0n's book is based 
upon just that, I think it is worth quoting his definition here: "Sociobiology is 
defined as the systematic study of the biological basis of all social behavior" 
(Wilson 1975:4). 
Note carefully that Wilson did not say that all social behavior can be under- 
stood by the systematic study of its biological basis, although it is true that he 
comes close to suggesting just that in some of his unguarded moments. These 
moments appear at the beginning and at the end of his volume, and clearly re- 
present an expression of exuberance at having accomplished such a tour de force. 
Surely Wilson has earned the right to crow a bit, and even if it does lead him to 
occasional uncautious overstatement, this can hardly detract from an accom- 
plishment of such magnitude. If this were the total of Wilson's sins, then Sahlins' 
insistence upon the "integrity of culture as a thing-in-itself" for which biology is 
"absolutely necessary" but an "absolutely insufficient" condition (pp. x-xi) 
should have been all the caution necessary. As Sahlins later put it, "I am making 
no more claim for culture relative to biology than biology would assert relative 
to physics and chemistry" (p. 63). 
This sober curb on Wilson's excessive claims is just what we should expect 
from a professional anthropologist, and if that is all there were to it, the flap 
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over sociobiology would never have reached the pages of Human Ecology, Iet 
alone the other avenues of exposure that qualify it as a "media event." Obviously 
there is more to it, and the more comes from the attempts of Sahlins and others 
to politicize the pursuit of science. For example, "What is inscribed in the theory 
of sociobiology is the entrenched ideology of Western society" (p. 101); which 
is really "genetic capitalism," (p. 72); and which assures the "naturalness" and 
"inevitability" of "the exploitation of others" (p. 77). 
You well may wonder how one gets from studying the biological basis of 
social behavior to the declaration that such a procedure promotes the "exploita- 
tion of others" without some pretty tortuous intermediary steps. These there 
are, but even after explanation, some are neither clear nor defensible. While dis- 
claiming "the slightest suggestion ofad hominem criticism," (p. xiii), the genesis 
of sociobiological evil is depicted thus: "Adam Smith produces a social version 
of Thomas Hobbes, Charles Darwin a naturalized version of Adam Smith; William 
Graham Sumner thereupon reinvents Darwin as society, and Edward O. Wilson 
reinvents Sumner as nature" (p. 93). Maybe that is not ad hominem, but the 
last of it surely would qualify as a saItus ad absurdum, or should that be vice- 
versa? 
If Sahlins' complaint, like that of Alexander Portnoy, appears to be ethnic, 
on the other hand it certainly is no joke, and for several reasons it would be 
wrong to call it the "French disease." At bottom, however, it would appear to 
be based on the same unwillingness to accept Darwinian evolution that has char- 
acterized French academia from 1859 right up to the present. This in turn is 
rooted in the Romantic tradition, in which it is unacceptable to think of life as 
being subject to the mechanics of the inorganic, and where human will is clearly 
superior to mere life. And if this is not the ethnocentrism against which anthro- 
pologists so frequently contend, it surely is a form of anthropocentrism about 
which they ought to be particularly careful. 
These are the general themes of the book, specified and implicit, but in 
the course of it Sahlins unwisely chooses to rest his case against his own version 
(perhaps I should say "perversion") of sociobiology on the development of a 
single anthropological case, "something like Durkheim's one well-chosen experi- 
ment that can prove (or disprove) a scientific law" (p. 41). Since he believes 
that the applicability of  "scientific sociobiology" to "the human sciences de- 
pends largely on the fate of its theory of kin selection" (p. 17), he feels that 
"the issue between sociobiology and social anthropology is decisively joined on 
the field of kinship." He notes that the driving force of Darwinian evolution is 
natural selection, which he correctly defines as the "differential reproduction 
among members of a species or population." But since he clearly feels that such 
a model for evolution is to be deplored, he adds that, "An effective anthropol- 
ogical criticism of kin selection, therefore, would do great damage to the thesis 
and interdisciplinary objectives of sociobiology" (p. 18). He then attempts to 
furnish an appropriate example. 
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What he does not consider are the consequences that would follow if his 
one well-chosen example were to prove the exact opposite of his expectation. 
As it happens, this indeed appears to be the case, although, at least in this book, 
he has yet to realize it. 
The case on which he chooses to take his stand is Polynesia, which he 
suggests is "privileged" since kinship is bilaterally reckoned ("cognatic") and so 
should provide conditions that are structurally favorable for the operation of 
"kin selection." Furthermore, Polynesia is where Sahlins has done his own field- 
work, and his expertise is well known. He discusses some examples from here 
and elsewhere and concludes that "each kinship order h a s . . ,  its own theory of 
heredity or shared substance, which is never the genetic theory of modern 
biology" (p. 57). 
This is perfectly true as stated, but he then presents a quantity of anec- 
dotal material which demonstrates how far real behavior deviates from that 
actually prescribed for given kinship orders. Given the degree of paternal un- 
certainty that follows from Polynesia's famous sexual freedom, it is evident that 
a rigid adherence to the stated rules of formal kinship practice would result in a 
failure to maximize investment in the promotion of a person's genetic material. 
But, as his informal data show, the widespread existence of fostering and adop- 
tion effectively balances the phenomenon of uncertain paternity. As I said, Sah- 
lins' use of exemplary material is selected and anecdotal, but it raises the intri- 
guing possibility that the theory of kin selection may just provide a better pre- 
diction for what people actually do under given circumstances than does a study 
of the kinship rules which they profess to follow. 
To a degree, then, it would appear that Sahlins has marshaled the evidence 
for his own defeat. In part this can be traced :to the anthropocentrism o f  the 
traditions of anti-Darwinism. The remainder is due to his chosen style of pre- 
sentation which is structured along the lines of continental debate rather than of 
investigative science. As a previous review of his book has noted, he has cast his 
discussions in an "either-or" mold, a form of the adversary approach that is in- 
appropriate (Simpson 1977:773). The inappropriateness of  the adversary method, 
although noted in relation to another matter, has been well stated by Hammond 
and Adelman (1976:391), who write, "The focus on persons and their methods 
has led not only to the filing of bias statements but to the advocacy of the ad- 
versary method for the settlement of disputes about truth - a method which is 
ascientific not only in its procedure, but in its greater commitment to victory 
rather than to truth." The Use and Abuse of  Biology, as one might expect, is 
more committed to winning an argument than to scientific clarification. 
But I do not want to close on such a one-sidedly negative note, If I have 
not shared Sahlins' hostility to the "scientifiC sociobiology" of Wilson and his 
followers, I fully support his rejection of the "vulgar sociobiology" of Ardrey, 
Lorenz, and their ilk. Sahlins also points out some genuine weak spots in the 
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scientific sociobiology which bothers many observers - for instance, the mysti- 
cism that surrounds the process by which animals can identify the degree of their 
genetic representation in their relatives and accordingly govern their behavioral 
investment. But when some, in the name of sociobiology, claim that human so- 
cial systems are genetically predetermined, and others shout back that this is 
simply the projection of a reactionary political ideology, my feelings, like those 
of Simpson, are best expressed in the words of the Bard: "A plague o' both your 
houses." 
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